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ABSTRACT
In order to understand, grasp and gain knowledge 
about the often chaotic world around us the 
strategies that we today know as the disciplines 
science, art, philosophy etc. have been developed. 
In contemporary discussions on the relations 
between research, design, science and art one can 
be surprised of how deep the chasms has become 
between different fields of knowledge. The big 
and urgent question is how we more consciously 
can elucidate, raise the status for and 
systematically make use of all the knowledge that 
is produced outside of the borders of what is 
considered “scientific”, a territory in where 
architecture and design mostly work.
The philosopher Mats Rosengren argues that all 
knowledge and truths are created by us, and he 
sketches another kind of theory of knowledge – a 
doxology. Since no truth, evidence or knowledge 
exists outside its human context, the rhetoric 
based on the good argumentation is central to all 
knowledge, according to Rosengren. Rhetoric can 
become a tool for scientific inquiries into our 
human knowledge. In the same way as rhetoric 
can say something about certain situations, the 
paper argues that the architectural project can be 
able to do so as well.
Rhetoric is of great importance within all 
architectural practice, you have to present good 
arguments for your proposal to a broad audience. 
Richard Buchanan has argued that a new conception 
of design is needed, recognizing the inherently 
rhetorical dimension of all design thinking. 
Design and architecture as knowledge producing 
activities can be of many kinds. Designs and 
proposals can, as doxology, be a way of showing 
prevailing relations, norms, values, and truths in 
specific situation. Thereby can also unexpected 
solutions be shown, surprising possibilities that 
where not thought of before, that where 
“impossible”, maybe “unacceptable” within the 
doxa, before they where given a form and 
presented. Here design thinking and new 
doxological notions of knowledge can give new 
ways of producing knowledge.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to understand, grasp and gain knowledge about 
the often chaotic world around us several strategies 
have been developed by humanity. These have 
developed into what we today know as science, art, 
philosophy etc., whose objectives in different ways are 
to help us settle down in the world and also change it to 
the better. New knowledges give new possibilities to 
act and influence.
But it is of course no linear process where 
understanding comes before acting; direct action, 
experimenting and trial of possibilities lead to new 
knowledge and experiences. When we confront 
concrete problems and situations a lot of different 
strategies, ways of thinking and procedures are used 
simultaneously to analyze, understand and handle the 
problems.
The borders between science, art, humanities, 
technology have become strong in spite of the fact that 
words like “technique”, “art”, “machine”, “design” 
actually are closely connected. These inner connections 
have been denied for a long time, and after the 
Renaissance the art world was separated from the 
world of technology and machines; a branch of the 
scientific and quantifiable where put against the 
spiritual and qualitative. Vilém Flusser has argued that 
it was in the end of the nineteenth century that the word 
design started to bridge between the separated domains, 
and became a place where art, technology and the 
scientific was brought together. (Flusser 2003) Design 
is, in the words of Flusser, to deceive nature with 
technology, to surpass nature with the artistic, to 
construct machines that in an artful way makes us free 
artists. Design is to productively fecundate magnificent 
ideas from separate fields like science, art, economy, 
philosophy with each other.
In contemporary discussions on the relations between 
research, design, science and art one can nevertheless 
be surprised of how deep the chasms has become 
between different fields of knowledge. The big and 
urgent question is how we more consciously can 
elucidate, raise the status for and systematically make 
use of all the knowledge that is produced outside of the 
borders that has been drawn around what is considered 
“scientific”. And this is a territory in where architecture 
and design mostly work. This paper is an attempt to 
discuss and bring in some different perspectives on this 
question. I argue that design could be used as a way of 
producing knowledge, especially if we consider 
knowledge as something created by us, and with 
rhetorical dimensions. The line of argument draws in the 
question of what architectural design knowledge is in 
relation to scientific knowledge, involving issues of 
different ways and notions of thinking, arguing, 
constructing, and forming.
DESIGN, SCIENCE, AND FORM
Erik Stolterman has – in a simplified picture – indicated 
that there are two ways or strategies to deal with the 
reality we live in. One applies the method of dismantling 
to learn how reality functions. The other is assembling 
parts to create a changed reality. The first can be seen as 
the procedure of science, the second as a design effort. 
What Stolterman is emphasising is that the strategies are 
used with different purposes – the dismantling is done to 
create knowledge of how thing function; the assembling 
is done to create something that not yet exists. He argues 
that it is a danger both in seeing these activities as 
essentially different and in mixing them up to much. 
Either do they not communicate with each other at all, or 
lose their unique characters and strengths. What is 
needed instead is a stronger respect for the distinctive 
nature in both traditions, and since science has a strong 
tradition while there is a lack of an own intellectual 
tradition within design, the latter has to be developed. 
(Stolterman 2004)
But the question is if design thinking always is used with 
such a different purpose as Stolterman argues. Could not 
to assemble just as well be a way of trying to understand 
and produce knowledge? To dismantle is certainly a good 
way to analyse, to see what factors are involved and to 
understand the parts as such, but every explanatory 
model, every theory is an assemblage of elements that 
can give possibilities to understand relations and 
connections, to predict and influence future events. 
Jerker Lundequist has argued that the most important 
achievements of science is not inventions or discoveries 
but the establishment of new theories and concepts. 
These concepts and theories are of course constructions, 
assemblages and organisations of thought elements.
There are certainly different attitudes to the world one is 
striving to understand or shape, but to think variability 
and becomings has many times implied problems both 
for philosophy and science. Colin Rowe and Fred 
Koetter discussed in their famous text “Collage City” 
with reference to Claude Levi-Strauss two different 
strategies – the methods of science and of bricolage. 
Science is described as searching for the truths of 
universe while the bricoleur is directed towards a set of 
remains that are at hand; one is then dismantling, the 
other assembling. (Rowe & Koetter 1999) Rowe & 
Koetter urged for the acknowledgment of both science 
and bricolage as relevant ways to deal with problems, 
and that there are great possibilities if the “civilized” 
thinking – full of overestimations of logical sequence – 
could be placed on equality with the “savage” thinking 
full of analogical leaps. Henri Bergson has written that 
to be able to understand and think reality in all its 
multiplicity and continuously moving change we have 
to install ourselves directly in it. But that is exactly 
what the intellect – and science – generally refuses to 
do since it is so used to think the mobile through the 
immobile. Our intellect is according to Bergson 
constituted in a way to primarily create distinct 
delimitations and to think change as transitions from 
one stably delimited state to next; the world is changing 
between relatively stable and immobile forms and 
bodies. “But in reality the body is changing form at 
every moment; or rather, there is no form, since form is 
immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is 
the continual change of form: form is only a snapshot 
view of transition.” (Bergson 1998) Our perception 
manages to freeze the flowing continuity of reality to 
incoherent, disconnected images. 
To understand and approach the moving reality one has 
to reinstate oneself within it. Installed within change 
one is able, according to Bergson, to directly grasp both 
the change as such and the successive states in which it 
could be frozen. But if these successive states is 
conceived from the outside as real and not as potential 
immobilities, one will never reach the change or 
movement as such no matter how small intervals that is 
done. Movement, dynamics and change can never be 
understood or created from the immobile, static or 
eternal. In spite of the many years that has passed since 
Bergson and also Rowe & Koetter formulated their 
exhortations, they still seem valid, urgent and important 
for architecture as well as research.
Form is something that is not only of great concern for 
designers, it is very important for science and the 
production of knowledge as well. All knowledge is 
actually about form; what we can have knowledge 
about has a form – or is given form in the production of 
knowledge. (Deleuze 1990; Deleuze 1995; Nilsson 
2007) Knowledge always relates to forms, to concrete 
assemblages or formations of matter, words and signs. 
It can be environments in the form of buildings and 
things; texts in the form of laws, reports, programs, 
norms. Every historical moment, that we live in or are 
trying to understand, is a complex formation of things, 
discourses, architectures, and social mechanisms. To 
produce knowledge is to give form to the specific 
problem or situation; a situation that can seem chaotic, 
produced by the prevailing diagrammatic power 
relations.
Let us return to the strategies to grasp the world that 
were delineated in the introduction. Science, art and 
philosophy where said to be different ways to approach 
reality, and all these are in the eyes of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari all creating and acting activities. In the 
book What is Philosophy? Deleuze & Guattari argue that 
philosophy is the discipline for creation of concepts, 
which never are given but have to be invented, 
fabricated, formed, created. (Deleuze & Guattari 1994) 
The book is an attempt to find out what philosophy 
actually is or is occupied with, especially in relation to 
other activities and ways of thinking that also tries to 
bring some order to our often chaotic reality. It is not an 
attempt to purify disciplines in order to put up walls 
between them, but they are in my view rather trying to 
make us see that different disciplines use different ways 
of thinking that include different kinds of thought 
material, different elements that are assembled in 
different ways. These disciplines are continuously in 
contact with each other, overlap and inspire to new lines 
of thought within the different fields. But a greater 
awareness of that you actually are moving between 
different forms of thought can give greater consistency to 
the actual thought or idea. This is to some extent also in 
line with the stronger respect for distinct natures of 
disciplines that Stolterman talks about.
Philosophy's exclusive right to create concept does not, 
according to Deleuze & Guattari, give it some priority or 
privilege since there are other ways of thinking and 
creating, other ways of getting ideas, that not have to go 
through concepts. Deleuze & Guattari delineate the three 
main forms of thought as philosophy, science and art. 
What they all have in common is that they always 
confront chaos; they put out a plane or throw a net over 
chaos but in different ways. Philosophy works with 
concepts that are put together in consistent planes; 
science works with functions put together on planes of 
references or systems; art works with composite 
emotions – “blocks of sensations” – on  planes of 
composition. All these strategies appear, in the view of 
Deleuze & Guattari, as most pragmatic and constructing 
with an obvious design attitude.
The most important difference between science and 
philosophy is their different attitudes to chaos, argue 
Deleuze & Guattari. Chaos is rather change, appearance 
and disappearance of forms, transitions between different 
kinds of orders in an infinitely high speed, than being 
just disorder. “Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and 
disappearance.” Science approaches chaos by trying to 
slow down speeds, freeze changing situations in order 
to understand and produce knowledge, which then 
attempts to be generally valid, static knowledge. Other 
kinds of strategies, in their case philosophy, instead try 
to create consistent, coherent thinking but with retained 
speed and mobility – primarily within thought, the free, 
exploring thought – to be able to create new lines, new 
ways to look at, understand and assemble reality. It is a 
matter of finding ways to give possibility for 
becomings of new assemblages, new understandings 
and knowledges about the world, which could be said 
to be knowledge of a more dynamic kind in continuous 
movement.
We all, as human beings, are always constructing our 
tools, models, metaphors, images and notions to help us 
handle and predict the changing world around us. By 
building more and more knowledge about the material 
world, we have also been able to distance us from it; it 
has become an object ruled by laws independent from 
ourself. But is there any knowledge really independent 
of us?
KNOWLEDGE AND RHETORIC
The starting point in a discussion about knowledge and 
rhetoric is for the Swedish philosopher Mats Rosengren 
the fact that all the knowledge we as human beings 
have – from theoretical understandings to practical 
attainments – are our human knowledge. By talking 
about “our human knowledge”, all dreams about the 
stability and ground of knowledge are abandoned. 
Rosengren shifts the valuation of the terms in the 
classical opposition between doxa – what we believe 
about the world and ourselves – and episteme – how 
thing really are. Rosengren argues that all knowledge is 
doxical and he tries to sketch another kind of theory of 
knowledge – a doxology. (Rosengren 2002) A doxology 
has to consider both the practical and theoretical 
aspects of knowledge, as well as the condition that it is 
people with different interests and possibilities that 
carries the knowledge, creates the practices and 
formulate the theories. The basic thought in this 
doxology is that what we traditionally see as 
knowledge, truth, and objectively set quantities to 
check our human endeavours against, actually are 
human – by human beings created – measures. Thereby 
these measures are changeable and formable. 
(Rosengren 2006)
We have to do a theoretical turn away from the given 
epistemological certainty, accept that no clear and 
sharp border between true knowledge and pure beliefs 
can be drawn, and see the conditioned, assumed and 
biased knowledge. Since no truth, evidence or 
knowledge exists outside or beyond its human context, 
the rhetoric, with its relativistic view of knowledge, is 
central to all knowledge, according to Rosengren. The 
basis for knowledge is the good arguments and not the 
incontestable proofs. What counts is the arguments that 
are regarded as good in a specific historical situation, a 
particular society, group or scientific discipline. 
Rosengren argues that doxology is about situated, 
changing and interested knowledge. He argues that 
criteria for knowledge not should be “true” or 
“objective” in the way of corresponding to a non-human, 
objective and neutral reality, but interesting in relation to 
the specific knowledge situation.
Rosengren takes the meaning of doxa in his doxology 
from the ancient contrast between episteme, knowledge, 
and doxa, what you believe is true, opinions. Doxa 
delineates the network of convictions, habits, practices, 
traditions and models of thought that surround us all. 
Doxa is what we hold as true, our beliefs, prejudices, 
opinions that are prevailing within a society or group of 
people. He argues that the opposition between episteme 
and  doxa, the difference between knowledge and 
opinions is a chimera that is based on a misunderstanding 
of the roles and status of opinions in our production of 
knowledge.
If we take Protagoras’ statement “man is the measure for 
everything” seriously, than it has vast consequences for 
what traditionally has been considered truth and 
knowledge, Rosengren argues. More than just meaning 
that all knowledge and truths are human because it we 
that possess them, it means that we never can know 
anything in the way Plato and all the Western scientific 
thinking strive for. It tells us that every notion of an 
objective, neutral, given and uninterested knowledge is 
an illusion. But we do not need to abandon concepts like 
knowledge, truth, facts, objectivity, we rather have to 
understand them as immanent, valid only within the 
framework of our human measurements.
When Rosengren talks about rhetoric, and the opinions 
that rhetoric takes as a point of departure, it is with the 
intention to get away from the Platonic dichotomies and 
not to install rhetoric in the place of philosophy. He 
argues that rhetoric is a more adequate point of departure 
when trying to understand ourselves, our knowledge as 
well as creations. Rhetoric does not yield a more true or 
better description of reality, but it makes possible an 
other, different and, for contemporary problems in 
politics and science, more relevant view on truth, 
knowledge and value.
Science and philosophy have developed methods to 
separate the true from the false, the real from the 
illusionary – episteme from doxa. “Rhetoric do not 
discover truths, it creates the truths that are needed for 
the moment. Or, if you would like, it creates doxa, but 
never episteme.” (Rosengren 2006:79)
Rosengren states that we are never discovering or 
finding truths, values or facts – we are always creating 
them. But this does not mean that we can create 
without limitation or just everything. Our acts of 
creation are not free, it is limited, but not determined, 
predestined or reduceable. Rosengren is deeply 
influenced by Cornelius Castoriadis and his notion of 
autonomy, meaning that we ourselves create the laws of 
the world (auto nomos), they are not given, but all stem 
from us. Opposed to autonomy is heteronomy (hetero 
nomos – laws coming from outside), and heteronomous 
thinking has dominated Western thought in religion, 
politics, history and philosophy. Every attempt to base 
our human world in something outside of or beyond 
this world is a thought of heteronomy. The doxology 
that Rosengren is arguing for is a way of trying to think 
autonomy, to take away the myths of pure reason and 
the neutral objectivity of science. All knowledge, all 
facts are interested, meaning that they are always 
produced in a specific context as an answer to a 
particular strive for knowledge. “We have ourselves 
created, and are continuously creating, all our 
knowledge, all our politics and our world – so the 
question is first and foremost how we create and not if 
this creation of ours is corresponding, or not 
corresponding, to something ‘out there’.” (Rosengren 
2006:21)
A rhetorical theory of knowledge sees all knowledge, 
all facts, values and truths as contained within one or 
another doxa. It means they can be considered as a 
point of departure for an argumentation. If we accept 
that truth and facts are based on good arguments, but 
never on incontestable proofs, the rhetoric approach 
will be as most effective, Rosengren argues. By 
emphasising the social character of all knowledge, by 
not accepting some scientific or philosophical notion of 
objective or uninterested production of knowledge, 
then will the rhetorical philosophy, according to 
Rosengren, be able to show that even what we have 
considered to be epistemic knowledge always has been 
doxa.
Doxology sees knowledge as localised and produced in 
and through action – the practices that produce and 
maintain knowledge is inseparable from knowledge 
itself. Rosengren sees rhetoric as a thought-organ, a 
organon, that is something that you use to create as well 
as act. Rhetoric can become a tool for scientific inquiries 
into our human knowledge. (Rosengren 2002) It is done 
by shifting the role of rhetoric from showing how to 
influence a certain person or audience at a certain 
occasion to instead being an instrument to show what 
this person or audience believe, value and know in a 
specific context and moment.
The way Rosengren describe elements in rhetoric – how 
to make an inventory of the topic, arrange and deliver 
your arguments based on reason, emotions, confidence 
etc – has apparent similarities with central parts of 
architectural practice and design activities. In the same 
way as Rosengren means that rhetoric can say something 
about the doxa and knowledges of the situation, the 
architectural project or design proposal could be able to 
do so as well – show what is possible to do or imagine, 
what values that are prevailing, what conceptions and 
knowledges that are accepted, and who has the privilege 
of formulating the problem.
RHETORIC AND DESIGN
Rhetoric is of great importance within all architectural 
practice, you have to present good arguments for your 
proposal and be able to communicate it with a broad 
audience. Within architectural competitions the 
importance of rhetoric is especially obvious, and 
Elisabeth Tostrup has studied this specific field of design 
practice. (Tostrup 1999; Tostrup 2007) The winner of an 
architectural competition is not the most objective 
presentation, but the designer who is able to create a 
proposal based on the best arguments. Tostrup states that 
the material of the competition expresses the hegemonic 
architecture of its time – the network of political, 
economic and social relations where some actors have a 
dominating position – and the proposals are trying to 
communicate its arguments within the field of prevailing 
values, thoughts and ideas. The rhetoric of architectural 
competitions – and most of all designers’ proposals one 
might add – works with a three folded rhetoric, Tostrup 
argues; through the physical architecture of the proposal, 
through the visual presentation of drawings, images, 
models, and through the text material including the 
program as well as the description of the proposal. By 
studying different competitions she tries to analyse what 
is valued as “the best architecture” in the given situation, 
what ways of thinking, ideals and prejudices that is 
hidden beneath the rhetoric of the designs.
Richard Buchanan has stated that a new conception of 
design is needed, a new conception of the discipline as 
a humanistic enterprise, recognising the inherently 
rhetorical dimension of all design thinking. (Buchanan 
1995) The subject matter of design is here important, 
where there are tendencies to reduce design to a form 
of science which has a fixed or determinate subject 
matter that is given to the designer. But the subject 
matter of design is not given, it is created through the 
activities of invention and planning. There could be 
said to be a determinacy in natural science – 
discoveries to be made of something constantly 
available – and the goal of inquiry is knowledge of 
properties and predictability of processes. “There is no 
similar determinacy in the activity of designing. The 
subject matter is radically indeterminate, open to 
alternative resolutions even with the same 
methodology.” (Buchanan 1995:24)
There is a specific indeterminateness of design and 
design thinking – that the subject matter of design is 
indeterminate in relation to other disciplines – since it 
is applied to new and changing situations, limited only 
by the inventiveness of the designer or team. Then the 
most important is not the products as such, but the art 
of conceiving and planning products, Buchanan argues. 
“In other words, the poetics of products – the study of 
products as they are – is different from the rhetoric of 
products – the study of how products come to be as 
vehicles of argument and persuasion about the 
desirable qualities of private and public life.” From this 
perspective, design history, theory, and criticism should 
balance any discussion of products with the particular 
conceptions that stand behind the product in its 
historical context.
The characteristic indeterminacy of subject matter 
makes design a discipline fundamentally concerned 
with matters that admit alternative resolutions; 
solutions and understandings that are created rather 
than discovered. Designers deal with matters of choice 
– with things that may be other than they are – and the 
essential nature of design calls for both the process and 
the results of designing to be open to debate and 
disagreement. Designers deal with possible worlds and 
with opinions about what the human environment 
should be, and any design decision is open to 
questioning and debate.
Buchanan describes all making as an integrative, 
synthetic activity, and with reference to Aristotle he 
stresses the importance of distinguishing the element of 
forethought from the specific considerations and 
activities relevant to each kind of making. “Forethought 
is an ‘architectonic’ or ‘master’ art, concerned with 
discovery and invention, argument and planning, and the 
purposes or ends that guide the activities of the 
subordinate arts and crafts.” (Buchanan 1995:31) The 
element of forethought in making is what subsequently 
came to be known as design. Already in the ancient 
world, the core art of rhetoric served as a basis for 
systematic forethought in the forms of making in words, 
providing the organization of thought in narrative and 
argument as well as the composition and arrangement of 
words in style.
Rhetoric has exerted powerful influences on arts of 
making in other materials than words, and has often 
provided a way of connecting ethics, politics, and the 
theoretical sciences with the activities of making. 
Buchanan shows the complex relations between rhetoric 
and making, and from the Renaissance, the practical arts 
of making were distinguished from the fine arts as well 
as from the theoretical sciences and rhetoric. Design, 
separated from making as well as the intellectual and fine 
arts, were in many ways left without an intellectual 
foundation of its own. “Therefore, instead of becoming a 
unifying discipline directed toward the new productive 
capabilities and scientific understanding of the modern 
world, design diminished in importance and fragmented 
into the specializations of  different types of production, 
leaving its connection with other human enterprises and 
bodies of knowledge vague and uncertain.” (Buchanan 
1995:34)
Buchanan points at the similarities between the problems 
identified by Herbert Simon and  problems discussed by 
Aristotle. He sees Simon’s proposed solution of a science 
of design as having features that are both rhetorical – an 
emphasis on deliberation and decision making – and 
poetic, in the sense that all human made products could 
be analysed and understood from the activity of making. 
A science of the artificial could be seen as interested in 
the elements of forethought – and thereby the rhetoric – 
operating behind all arts of making.
The themes of rhetoric have, according to Buchanan, 
during the last century emerged in design because they 
provide the integrative connections that are needed in an 
age of technology. The pattern of rhetoric in recent 
design builds upon distinctions which were established in 
rhetorical theory and developed to meet changing 
circumstances. The traditional divisions of rhetoric are 
by Buchanan described as invention, judgement, 
disposition (planning the sequence of argument), delivery 
(choosing the appropriate vehicle for presenting 
arguments to different audiences) , and expression 
(choosing the appropriate stylistic embodiment of 
arguments).
Design has become an art of deliberation essential for 
making in all phases of human activity. It applies to 
making of theories which attempt to explain the natural 
operations of the world, just as much as it applies to 
making policies and institutions, and the making of 
objects. “Deliberation in design yields arguments: the 
plans, proposals, sketches, models, and prototypes 
which are presented by designers as the basis for 
understanding, practical action, or production. Design 
is the art of shaping arguments about the artificial or 
human-made world, arguments which may be carried 
forward in the concrete activities of production in each 
of theses areas, with objective results ultimately judged 
by individuals, groups, and society.” (Buchanan 
1995:46)
Here rhetoric and design – as well as the rhetoric of 
design – can be important means to produce 
knowledge, especially by further developing the 
architectural and design disciplines in relation to the 
notions brought forth by doxology.
DESIGN AND RESEARCH
Design, and especially architectural design, has 
possibilities to become a more conscious tool for 
thought other than merely be for the production of 
products and buildings. Sanford Kwinter has argued 
that architecture no longer is the usual devotion to 
objects, but is becoming an organon, that is a means to 
gain knowledge, a system of inquiry, innovation and 
technique. (Kwinter 1998) The produced formations of 
architectural projects, the assemblages of matter, 
discourses and functions, could be objects of 
knowledge. Architectural design as a practice of 
formation, of material organisation, of giving form to 
elusive and contradictory forces of the project 
embedded in a complex society has a great capacity to 
produce knowledge. As Peter Downton writes: “Once 
in the world of things and ideas, a design can be seen as 
a repository of knowledge and interrogated to reveal 
the knowledge its designers have both intentionally and 
unintentionally embodied there.” (Downton 2003) The 
realised material form could inform us about the 
conditions and governing forces producing them.
Sanford Kwinter has also argued for what he calls an 
extended “true formalism” instead of the “poor 
formalisms” that are limited by a conflation of the 
notion of “form” with that of “object”. The problems of 
form are, according to Kwinter, rather about the 
mechanisms of formation, about processes in which 
discernable patterns are emerging out of a less finely-
ordered field. Form is in this perspective ordering action, 
a logic deployed while the object is merely a resulting 
image of that process. Kwinter writes that true formalism 
refers to any method that diagrams the proliferation of 
fundamental resonances between the form of the object 
(or the form of expression) and the form of the content 
that produces the object, and demonstrates how these 
accumulate into figures of order and shape. In a line of 
arguments that seems to owe a lot to Foucault, Kwinter 
argues that true formalism offers the possibility for “a 
pragmatic description of historical emergence (why this 
object, institution or configuration here, in this place, at 
this time, and not that?)”. (Foucault 1972; Kwinter 2003)
Formalism in Kwinters view demonstrates that form is 
resonance and expression of embedded forces, and the 
best local formalisms show that these embedded forces 
are themselves organised and have a pre-concrete, logical 
form of their own. It is about peering into the object 
towards its rules of formation and the dynamic relation 
between these two levels of form. The manifest form that 
appears is the result of a computational interaction 
between internal rules and external pressures that, 
themselves, originate in other adjacent forms, according 
to Kwinter. But I would argue that many of the forces of 
the external (as well as internal) pressures are more of a 
diagrammatic, formless kind, that the forming action of 
the architectural project actually gives form to them as 
well, and thereby presents a possibility for knowledge 
about them. This formalism of Kwinters also have 
connections to or could be further developed in relation 
to rhetoric and a doxological view of knowledge.
Design and architecture as knowledge producing 
activities can be of many kinds. It can be done by using a 
repertoire of historically known solutions and apply them 
in a context so patterns emerge more clearly or that these 
solutions give rise to new functions and new ways of 
looking at situations. It can be by using architectural 
tools and imagination to grasp and freeze conditions, 
influencing factors, demands and dreams in a specific 
situation and give it visual, material form that can be a 
point of departure for understanding and gaining 
knowledge about the situation and the included elements. 
Designs and proposals can, as doxology, be a way of 
showing prevailing relations, norms, values, and truths in 
specific situation. Thereby can also unexpected solutions 
be shown, surprising possibilities that where not thought 
of before, that where “impossible”, maybe 
“unacceptable” within the current doxa, before they 
where given a form and presented. Here design 
thinking and new doxological notions of knowledge 
can give new ways of producing knowledge.
Since a couple of years the discussions in science 
theory is expanding its scope to incorporate or make 
use of other ways of working, where a design attitude, 
practice and contexts of application have come to be in 
a focus of interest. (Gibbons et al. 1994) Here 
architecture, with its ramifications into, its bringing 
together (and many times dependence) of different 
disciplines, could be a palpable field for production of 
knowledge about the realities and societies that are 
dealt with. But an active work is of course needed to 
show, articulate and develop new ways to produce 
knowledge in a field and profession that often appears 
as vague regarding what knowledge that is possessed 
and contributed. (Nilsson 2004) There is anyhow a 
chance to turn the work with vague, anexact concepts 
in problematic, elusive situations characteristic for 
architecture and design disciplines, into an asset of 
tools and trained abilities to deal with complexity, 
chaos and change. A further development of design 
disciplines based on rhetoric and doxology is here of 
great importance for making design thinking important 
in knowledge production.
Science and production of knowledge have always a 
difficult tightrope to walk. There is a need for inner 
consistency, adaptation to the inner demands 
concerning what is regarded as science, and a certain 
distance to the objects of study. At the same time, there 
is a need for an openness to the outer world one is 
striving to explain and understand, where really 
descending into reality or pull in new things, notions, 
changed material and social conditions can lead to the 
opening of new ways for productions of knowledge. 
Here are constantly two poles of on the one hand 
systematisation, limitation, drawing of borders, and on 
the other messiness, liberation, transgression. We need 
them both when trying to understand the chaotic reality, 
and constructing a graspable world – a world of things, 
societies, truths, and knowledges, that is created, and 
designed, by ourselves.
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